This article examines the link between restrictions on the number of physicians and general practitioners'earnings. Using a representative panel of 6; 016 French self-employed GPs over the years 1983 to 2004, we show that the policies aimed at manipulating the number of places in medical schools strongly a¤ect physicians'permanent level of earnings.
Introduction
Like many industrialized countries, France experienced a rapid increase in the total number of physicians after the Second World War. For general practitioners (GPs), the physician:population ratio increased continously until 2000 and it is currently one of the highest among OECD countries. Such an increase may be appropriate if there was a previous shortage in medical services. At some point, however, needs are ful…lled and an excessive number of physicians is likely to lower their earnings.
In France, GPs are paid on a fee-for-services basis. Since fees are …xed by bargaining, there is no market-clearing price for ambulatory care. Equilibrium can be reached with adjustments in care quality, such as changes in the duration of consultations. However, this kind of adjustment is necessarily limited: an excessive number of GPs leads to a situation where more doctors share a limited amount of demand. Consequently, each GP provides a lower quantity of services and receives lower earnings because of the fee-for-services payment system.
In France, the baby-boom led to a huge increase in the number of medical students at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. In order to regulate the supply of health care, a reform implemented in 1971 limited the number of new medical school graduates. Since then, the numerus clausus de…nes the annual number of students allowed to continue their medical studies after the …rst year.
By the end of the seventies, all the French physicians' associations had become aware that their earnings were threatened by an excessive number of physicians: they put pressure on the government for a sizeable reduction in the number of new practitioners. Afterwards, the numerus clausus was drastically cut. A severely restrictive policy was thus implemented as of 1979. Given that studies to become a GP last 9 to 10 years, its potential e¤ects can be observed only for physicians who began to practice in the year 1988 or later.
It is politically di¢ cult for governments to implement or reduce a numerus clausus. Indeed, they are immediately confronted with the dissatisfaction of …rst year medical students. Furthermore, the impact of such policies is not perceptible for a long time because of the duration of medical studies.
This article examines the link between regulation of the number of physicians in France and GPs' earnings. Using longitudinal data about French GPs, we estimate earnings functions to identify experience, cohort and time e¤ects. The cohort is de…ned by the …rst year in practice. We focus on cohort e¤ects to examine the relationship between changes in medical demography and earnings inequality among doctors. Did GPs'earnings su¤er from an excessive number of new practioners for those who set up their practices during the eighties? Did subsequent cohorts bene…t from restrictions in the numerus clausus? In other words, did the numerus clausus buoy up physicians'earnings?
Because of the 10 year time lag in the impact of such a policy, empirical evaluation calls for the use of a sample of physicians observed over a su¢ ciently long period. We have at our disposal a This sample is drawn from the administrative …les on self-employed physicians collected by the public health insurance scheme. Reliable data on the earnings of self-employed workers in general are rare. French ambulatory care administration produces reliable data on physicians'earnings: the public health insurance scheme observes GPs'earnings because it reimburses patients for their payments to doctors.
Literature about physicians' earnings in industrialized countries is rare. Most studies focus on the impact of payment schemes on care provision (McGuire, 2000) . More broadly, studies about selfemployed professionals are rather scarce. Pioneering work was performed in 1945 by Friedman and Kuznets who compared physicians to other professionals (lawyers, dentists). Lazear and Moore (1984) studied careers of self-employed professionals using cross-sectional data. More recently, Ajayi-Obe and Parker (2005) compared earnings of British self-employed professionals and employees using longitudinal data, but without studying the career pro…les. To our knowledge, no one to date has estimated the career pro…les of self-employed professionals using longitudinal data. Our estimates of physicians' career pro…les make it possible to understand why medical demography at the beginning of practice has so much in ‡uence on their permanent earnings. Moreover, our pro…le estimates might shed light on results relative to salaried workers. For the latter, the in ‡uence of seniority on earnings is thought to re‡ect human capital accumulation and productivity incentives implemented by …rm managers (Lazear, 1981) . The earnings pro…les of self-employed physicians may be shaped by human capital accumulation, but there are no agency problems. Furthermore, they have more freedom than employees in the allocation of work time over their life spans. This paper is organized as follows. The …rst section describes the French market for ambulatory care. Then we present the data and a descriptive analysis of ‡uctuations in medical demography resulting from general demographic change and the numerus clausus. The following section is devoted to the estimation of the earnings function, with identi…cation of time, experience and cohort e¤ects. In the next section we carry out a more thorough analysis in order to interpret cohort e¤ects. In addition, we carry out a stochastic dominance analysis to …nd out whether or not average di¤erences between GPs belonging to di¤erent cohorts could be cancelled out by individual unobserved heterogeneity. The …nal section concludes.
2 The French market for ambulatory care
Insurance coverage
In France, about 99% of the population is covered by the public health insurance scheme. For each service provided, there is a reference fee …xed by agreement between physicians and the health insurance administration. Public health insurance is mandatory and …nanced by income-related contributions. It covers about 70% of the expenses corresponding to the reference fees. In addition to the public system, individuals can take out voluntary private insurance or be covered through occupational group private insurance. These complementary insurance contracts cover the share of expenses not covered by public health insurance (30%). Through these di¤erent kinds of insurance schemes, reference fees for 80% of the population were fully covered until 2000: In that year, a reform (CMU, Couverture Maladie Universelle) was implemented to provide free complementary coverage to people with low incomes.
Since the introduction of the CMU, reference fees have been fully covered for almost all the population.
Hence, on the demand side, there is no …nancial limit to the use of ambulatory care. Moreover, patients freely choose the physician they consult and can change their physician for another one at any time. To avoid excessive use of ambulatory care, a gatekeeping system was introduced at the end of year 2004.
In the period covered by our data (1983 2004) , the activity of the observed GPs was not a¤ected by this reform.
Physicians'payments and behaviour
In France, physicians providing ambulatory care are general practitioners or specialists. They are mainly self-employed and paid through a fee-for-service scheme. In this article, we focus on GPs, more than 90% of whom are exclusively self-employed. As stated above, reference fees are …xed for each service. More precisely, there are two sectors: in sector 1 overbilling is forbidden and in sector 2 it is authorized. GPs were allowed to join sector 2 only between 1982 and 1992: Currently, most GPs (87%) belong to sector 1 and are paid the reference fees. Therefore, their incomes depend only on the level and composition of their activity. The latter is mainly composed of o¢ ce visits (82% in year 2004) and home visits (15%), the remaining part being composed of small procedures (3%).
The market for ambulatory care is characterized by a monopolistically competitive structure (McGuire, 2000) . Physicians are not perfect substitutes and have some market power because of di¤er-ences in location and care quality. Each physician is supposed to maximize her utility, subject to the production function and the demand function. The production function describes the provision of care services, which depends positively on the number of hours of work and negatively on visit duration.
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Competition is more intense when the number of physicians increases: for each physician, the demand depends negatively on the number of physicians operating in the same area, and positively on visit duration (linked to care quality). Given the homogeneity of fees in sector 1 and the fact that patients are fully covered by insurance, fee levels have no in ‡uence on demand for services from a particular physician. When maximizing her utility subject to the production and demand functions, the physician sets the optimal quantity of services to provide, as well as the optimal number of hours of work and visit duration.
For the purpose of our study, we do not need to de…ne a more formal theoretical model. Our representation of the physician's behaviour is fully static. Within this framework, the physician's 1 In France visit duration does not a¤ect the level of payment for a visit, although a longer duration is likely to contribute to better care quality. Hence, in our production function the Gp's output is closely related to the number of consultations. For a given number of hours of work, the longer the visit duration, the lower the output. earnings depend only on the quantity of services provided. This quantity is in ‡uenced, on the demand side, by the number of physicians and visit duration and, on the supply side, by the physician's preferences regarding consumption and leisure. This representation is inspired by the model built by Bolduc et al. (1996) to study doctors'location choices. As in McGuire and Pauly (1991) , we could add a term describing demand inducement. It would positively in ‡uence the demand for care and have a negative impact on the physician's utility.
The number of practicing physicians
The supply of physicians is de…ned by the number of students who successfully complete medical studies in France. There is no regulation of the number of new practitioners through practice licences: every trained student is allowed to set up anywhere in the country. European students trained abroad are allowed to practice in France, provided they speak French and are not forbidden to practice in their own countries. Actually, foreign GPs are rare: in 2006, they represent only 1,8% of all practising GPs.
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Until 1988; the studies to become a GP lasted 7 years. Afterwards, medical studies were lengthened to 8 years in 1988 and 9 years in 2001. An exam for all medical students (Les épreuves classantes nationales-ECN ) was introduced in 2004, to better channel medical students into the various specialties, general practice being one of them. This reform has substantially altered the process of choice for general practice. A student with a high rank can now choose another specialty while, before the reform, she had to plan in advance whether she wanted to become a GP or not. In addition, this reform led many students to choose to repeat a year in order to reach a rank which would give them access to the specialty of their choice. Together with the selection introduced earlier by the numerus clausus, which obliged many students to repeat the …rst year, these individual strategies have lengthened medical studies to 9 or 10 years.
Places in medical schools have been regulated since 1971 via the numerus clausus, which introduced severe selection at the end of the …rst year. Depending on the year considered, only 10% to 20% of the students are allowed to continue with their medical education after the …rst year. The goal of earnings' improvement was not made explicit in France. Current government reports claim that the aim of this policy is to limit the number of physicians (Sénat, 2007) in order to help monitor the supply of health care and contain health expenditure growth.
The numerus clausus de…nes the annual number of students allowed to continue their medical studies after the …rst year. It was initially set at about 8,500 places. After its introduction it remained fairly constant for several years. At the end of the seventies, all the French physicians' associations had become aware that their earnings were threatened by an excessive number of physicians: they put pressure on the government for a sizeable reduction in the numerus clausus (Deplaude, 2007) . Afterwards, the latter was continuously reduced during about two decades, until 1999. During the nineties, it was set at a rather low level of 3,500 places. The potential in ‡uence of the numerus clausus is twofold: (i) it contributes to a decrease in the number of new practioners, thus increasing potential demand for each physician; (ii) the selection introduced by the numerus clausus sets up a tournament between …rst year students, which may lead to an improvement in the average ability of physicians. This paper examines whether the decrease in the number of new doctors caused by the numerus clausus contributed to an increase in physicians'
Recurrent problems in French ambulatory care regulation
In France, the regulation of ambulatory care is beset with recurrent problems which might eventually create serious di¢ culties. For GPs, the physician:population ratio increased until 2000, and is now one of the highest among OECD countries (in second place after Switzerland, HCAAM, 2007) . The geographic distribution of doctors in very uneven, which induces inequalities in access to care. Moreover, there is empirical evidence of supply-induced demand for French GPs (Delattre and Dormont, 2003) .
This behaviour is more prevalent in locations where the level of the physician:population ratio is high (more than 110 GPs per 100; 000 inhabitants).
Finally, there seems to be a decline in the attractiveness of the self-employed GP profession. Indeed, the 2004 reform in medical education (introduction of ECN ) has revealed that many students prefer not to specialize in general practice: 14% of the available GP positions were not chosen in 2006; in 2005, this proportion reached 40% (Billaut, 2006) . Furthermore, fewer students are willing to become self-employed; many choose to be salaried at the end of their studies (Bourgueil, 2007) .
The issue of the attractiveness of the GP profession is beyond the scope of this article. However, the shortage of candidates for GP positions is a symptom of problems attached to this profession. Our study examines whether there are substantial generational di¤erences in GPs'earnings.
3 Basic features of the data
The sample
We have at our disposal a 10% random sample of self-employed GPs practicing in France between 1983 and 2004. It is drawn from an administrative …le collected by the public health insurance scheme (Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés, CNAMTS). Given that public health insurance is mandatory and universal in France, this sample is drawn from an exhaustive source of information about self-employed physicians. 4 The panel is unbalanced: each physician i is observed for a period T i , which can begin after 1983 (for a physician who goes into practice after 1983) or end before 2004 (for a physician who retires before 2004). For each physician i at year t, we have information about age, gender, year of PhD, year of the beginning of practice, level and composition of activity (o¢ ce visits, home visits, surgery or radiology), location (95 départements in 22 régions), and practice earnings.
We decided to focus on sector 1 GPs. Sector 2 GPs represent a small proportion of total GPs: 13%.
We de…ne each cohort by the …rst year in self-employed practice. Our complete dataset provides information about GPs belonging to cohorts 1945 to 2003. This information has been used in the descriptive analysis of the cohort pyramid in the next subsection. In the econometric analysis, however, we selected GPs belonging to cohorts 1970 to 2001: Indeed, the number of GPs belonging to older cohorts was too small to allow for relevant statistical inference 5 .
The …nal sample used for the econometric analysis consists of 6; 016 GPs with a total of 81; 691 individual-year observations from 1983 to 2004. We observe 32 cohorts and 95 to 290 physicians per cohort. Experience ranges from 1 to 34 years (Table 1) Notes: French GPs, sector 1, period 1983-2004, 81,691 observations, cohorts 1970-2001 . Standard errors are in parentheses.
The cohort pyramid
Figure 1 displays the "cohort pyramid" drawn from our dataset, each cohort being de…ned by the …rst year in practice. This pyramid has a very chaotic shape, which results from the combined e¤ects of demographic changes and the numerus clausus.
To illustrate demographic changes, we have drawn the curve of the number of births 30 years earlier (on average, GPs begin their practice at age 30). Some typical cohorts are labelled but all cohorts are analysed in our study. Figure 1 shows a huge increase in the number of physicians for cohorts 1974
to 1978 : this is due to the baby-boom, given that the number of places in medical schools was not regulated for these cohorts.
The numerus clausus introduced a discrepancy between changes in the number of new GPs and general population growth, as shown on the right side of the …gure. We have displayed the value of the numerus clausus 9 years before the beginning of the practice (this interval corresponds to the average duration of medical studies). The pattern of the numerus clausus curve is noteworthy. It was fairly constant after its introduction and decreases at the end of the seventies only. A genuinely restrictive policy was implemented only from 1979 on: its e¤ects can be observed only beginning with the 1988 cohort.
The small number of physicians belonging to pre-1970 cohorts is due to retirements (left side of …gure 1). Notes: A cohort is de…ned by the …rst year of practice. The number of births (continuous line) is given 30 years before the …rst year of practice. The numerus clausus is the number of students allowed to go on with their studies after the …rst year. In the …gure is displayed the numerus clausus (dotted line) 9 years before the …rst year of practice 1972, 1977, 1985, 1993 and 1999 (which cohorts are situated at a relatively high level because they bene…ted from increases in reference fees that occurred regularly over the period, while older cohorts were by de…nition excluded from these increases. Econometric estimation makes it possible to disentangle cohort, time and experience e¤ects. 5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33 Experience Real earnings (€ 2004) 1999 1993 1985 1977 1972 Notes: Experience is de…ned as the number of years of practice
Empirical speci…cation
Consider y ict the log of earnings (in 2004 euros) in year t of the physician i belonging to cohort c. Our speci…cation is the following:
with i = 1; :::N ; c = 1::::C; t = 1::::T ; e = 1::::E; r = 1; :::R: is de…ned by the …rst year of practice. We also specify regional …xed e¤ects r , where r refers to the region of practice (there are several départements within each region).
The extensive use of various …xed e¤ects raises identi…cation problems. Our speci…cation is not identi…able unless we add linear restrictions. We used the following constraints: 
Constraint (3) imposes that there is no trend in cohort e¤ects, whereas constraint (4) imposes that there is no trend in time e¤ects.
Estimates of time, cohort and experience e¤ects di¤er greatly depending on whether constraint (3) or (4) is adopted. 8 The history of the period shows that (i) reference fees rose steadily because of general agreements; (ii) the baby-boom and the numerus clausus induced large ‡uctuations in medical demography. These facts suggest that disallowing a trend in time e¤ects would be overly restrictive. They give support to the idea that there is no trend in cohort e¤ects. We used alternative strategies to eliminate the colinearity between time, cohort and experience. They validated the absence of a trend in cohort e¤ects (constraint (3)). 
Econometric issues
Since some GPs leave the sample for reasons other than retirement, our estimates may be a¤ected by a selection bias. An examination of our dataset reveals that some GPs leave the sample either permanently (9% of observations) or for a transitory break (6% of observations). The reasons why doctors leave the sample are only partially observed. Some of them move from sector 1 to sector 2, where overbilling is allowed: it concerns 34% of permanent departures and 26% of transitory breaks.
Some move to another location (17% of transitory breaks). Other reasons for departures are not observed. Physicians who leave the sample have lower earnings than the others, suggesting a possible selection bias.
We cannot deal with this problem by using Heckman's sample selection model. Because GPs who 8 The experience pro…le is strongly a¤ected by the choice of constraint (3) or (4). Imposing (4) prevents any raise in reference fees from being incorporated into the estimated time e¤ects. The experience e¤ects then capture part of the time e¤ects (Dormont and Samson, 2007) . 9 For example, we agregated cohorts into 5 groups and estimated …xed e¤ects for groups of cohorts. Colinearity is eliminated since t 6 = (groups of c) + e. The pattern of the cohort e¤ects estimated with constraint (3) is very similar to the pattern of the curve corresponding to speci…cation in terms of groups of cohorts (see …gure 6 below). leave the sample do so for several reasons, participation in the sample cannot be speci…ed by a single participation equation. Following Verbeek and Nijman (1992), we simply added …ve dummy variables indicating if the GP has left the sample permanently or temporarily, to switch sectors, to change locations or for another reason. This procedure does not provide a correction for attrition bias but allows to check for its existence.
All dummies are negative and signi…cant, revealing a selection bias. For example, we …nd that GPs who experience a temporary break had lower earnings prior to the break (-12% if the break was due to a sector change, -17% for a location change). However, this bias does not a¤ect our main …ndings: some coe¢ cients are slightly a¤ected by the introduction of participation dummies, 10 but this is not the case for estimates of experience, time and cohort e¤ects. This appears clearly in …gures 3, 4 and 5.
Our speci…cation does not control for unobserved heterogeneity among physicians. Indeed, considering
an error-component model with a GP-speci…c e¤ect would prevent us from identifying the cohort e¤ects we are interested in. The model is estimated by ordinary least squares subject to constraints (2) and (3). This comes down to assuming that variables such as the physician:population ratio or the type of location (town, suburbs, urban sprawl, rural area) are exogenous. This is questionable: Bolduc et al.
(1996) have shown doctors'location choices are in ‡uenced by expected earnings in each location.
We decided to perform a Hausman test to check for exogeneity of the GP:population ratio. Indeed, each physician chose to set up practice in an area characterized by a given GP:population ratio.
Variables explaining demand for care services in each département are good candidates to serve as instruments. Only two variables had a signi…cant impact on the GP:population ratio: the proportion of women in the population of the département and the logarithm of average household income in the département. 11 Using these two instruments, the Hausman test led to non rejection of the as-1 0 One change concerns the estimated coe¢ cient of the GP: population ratio, which is equal to -0.0025 for the speci…-cation without participation dummies versus -0.0026 with dummies. For the coe¢ cient of the gender dummy (female), we obtain -0.343 without participation dummies versus -0.336 with dummies. These slight changes are the biggest we observe.
1 1 These two instruments are jointly signi…cant in the …rst-step regression (p<0.0001).
sumption that the GP:population ratio is exogenous (p = 0:90): Moreover, a Sargan test validated the instruments' exogeneity (p = 0:22). Another exogeneity test can be performed by introducing a slight change in the model speci…cation. Since the specialist:population ratio is never signi…cant, we moved this variable from model (1) and added it to the instrument list. This enabled us to test for the exogeneity of both GP density and the type of location (aggregated into three categories). The
Hausman's test led to non rejection of the null hypothesis that these variables are exogenous (p = 0; 26) and the Sargan test validated the instrument exogeneity. 12 Our …nding that GP density and location type are exogenous is rather surprising. Actually, our tests are limited by the small number of available instruments. Therefore, we were not able to carry out an exogeneity test for the regional dummies, which are also related to location choice. These variables are among the explanatory variables of the model used for the Hausman tests.
Results
We estimated three versions of model (1), one for each dependent variable: log of earnings, log of physician's activity or log of net earnings. Activity is de…ned as the total number of encounters between the physician and patients, where every encounter is counted as one (o¢ ce visit, home visit or small procedure). For a given activity level, earnings level depend on the composition of activity and the values of reference fees. In what follows, we discuss our results relative to the speci…cation explaining the log of earnings. When appropriate, we comment on results obtained on activity or net earnings.
The experience, time and cohort e¤ects estimated on the speci…cation explaining the log of earnings are reported in …gures (3) to (5). The other estimated parameters are presented in table 3.
On average, female GPs earn 34% less than male GPs. Since reference fees are the same for all, this gap is entirely due to di¤erences in activity: in the speci…cation explaining the log of activity, we …nd that female GPs'activity is 33% lower than males'. the reference income of female doctors is 26% lower than the reference income of their male colleagues.
In addition, male physicians take action if their incomes falls short of their reference income: they do not raise their hours of work, but they spend less time per patient and focus on more lucrative procedures to compensate for an income shortfall.
The GP:population ratio provides a measure of competition intensity between physicians within each département. For patients, the time cost of switching to another GP is smaller when there are many doctors in the neighbourhood. For GPs, an increase in the number of colleagues practicing in the area lowers the number of potential patients for each doctor. Our estimates reveal a sizeable impact of competition between GPs: a rise in the level of the GP:population ratio, for example from 100 to 110 per 100; 000 inhabitants, leads to a 2:5 percentage point drop in their earnings (table 3) . Conversely, GPs do not seem to compete with specialists: the specialists:population ratio is not signi…cant.
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1 3 This is why this variable was used as an instrument in the exogeneity test discussed above (performed on a version of the model excluding the specialists:population ratio). Nevertheless, table 3 presents the estimates of model (1), which includes the specialists:population ratio, as the non-signi…cance of this variable is an interesting result. (2) and (3). The estimated experience, time and cohort e¤ects are displayed on …gures (4) to (6) *** Statistically signi…cant at the 1% level; ** Statistically signi…cant at the 5% level; * Statistically signi…cant at the 10% level
The negative in ‡uence of GP density comes on top of regional e¤ects. Given that our speci…cation includes regional …xed e¤ects r , the estimated elasticity of the GP:population ratio is actually a within-region elasticity. Regional …xed e¤ects capture the time-invariant impact on GPs'earnings of certain characteristics of regions: amenities, average GP:population ratio and determinants of demand for care services. Our results show for example (table 3) that physicians in the PACA region (the Côte d'Azur in the south of France) earn on average 8% less than GPs in the Paris area (the reference region). In constrast, physicians in the region Nord (North) earn 21% more than physicians in the Paris region. On the demand side, these di¤erences stem from the fact that more GPs share a given number of potential patients in PACA, where medical density is very high, than in region Nord, where it is relatively low. On the supply side, these earnings disparities re ‡ect di¤erences in expected utility attached to each region when GPs chose their location (Bolduc et al., 1996) . In other words, some
GPs are willing to earn 8% less in the south, where they work less and enjoy the sun. In the north, they need 20% extra earnings to compensate for more work and a bad climate.
We now come to our estimates of time, experience and cohort …xed e¤ects.
Experience e¤ects
As shown in …gure (3), earnings are a reversed u-shaped function of experience. The pattern of GPs' career pro…les is di¤erent from the increasing and concave function of experience usually observed for salaried workers. Firstly, there is a huge increase at the beginning of the practice. Between the …rst and the seventh year (the reference year), earnings growth is 37%: Secondly, no stabilisation is observed after the beginning of the career, unlike salaried workers whose earnings remain fairly constant for much of their careers: GPs reach their maximum earnings after 12 years and then their earnings decrease rapidly. In comparison with the level of earnings reached after 7 years, the gap amounts to -12% after 25 years of practice and -24% after 30 years.
To interpret this result, it is important to keep in mind that GPs' earnings are closely related to their level of activity. The …rst stage of the GPs' career is characterized by a process of patient recruitment, which translates into the huge earnings increase observed in the …rst years of practice.
After reaching a peak with 12 years of experience, GPs'activity and earnings drop continuously.
There are numerous debates among labour economists about the in ‡uence of age and experience on individual productivity. Our results on self-employed doctors shed light on the behaviour of professionals whose work hours are mostly determined by individual preferences, contrary to salaried workers who are less free to choose their number of work hours. Our results indicate that GPs take advantage of the freedom o¤ered by self-employment by reducing their level of activity early in their career. They concentrate their activity in the …rst 12 years of practice.
Edward P. Lazear (1981) has theorized that …rm managers set up earnings pro…les designed to provide productivity incentives for salaried workers. Lazear and Moore (1984) argue that such incentives are not necessary for self-employed workers. They predict a ‡atter earnings-pro…le for the self-employed than for salaried workers and produce empirical evidence in support of this prediction. However, their results derive from estimates performed on cross-sectional data, which do not enable them to disentangle cohort and experience e¤ects. Our …ndings on longitudinal data do not con…rm Lazear and Moore's prediction. GP's activity decreases rapidly after 12 years, revealing a preference for leisure. 1988, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2003: Adjusting the earnings growth for the increase in activity over the period, we obtain a lower bound for the pure e¤ect of increases in reference fees on real earnings: over the period, we …nd a yearly growth rate equal to 0.99%. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 GPs belonging to the same cohort have some characteristics in common: they belong to the same generation, with possible speci…c preferences; they faced the same numerus clausus at the beginning of their medical studies; they set up their practices the same year, within the same demographic context.
In order to examine the link between cohort e¤ects and medical demography, we removed the cohort e¤ects from speci…cation (1) and replaced them by a linear-quadratic function of three variables characterizing the demographic situation at the beginning of each GP's career: value of the numerus clausus 9 years before the …rst year in practice; physician:population ratio during the …rst year in practice; change in the number of GPs during the …rst year in practice.
Estimating model (1) with the linear-quadratic function of these three variables instead of the cohort e¤ects leads to the curve displayed in …gure 5. Its pattern is very similar to estimated cohort e¤ects. We …nd a correlation coe¢ cient equal to 0.79: the demographic situation at the beginning of the practice is strongly connected to cohort e¤ects.
The variables used in this new estimation capture mainly the number of new practitioners at the beginning of practice and the di¤erence between new arrivals and retirements. Why is medical demography at the beginning of practice so important? Competition intensity between physicians is already taken into account in model (1) with the GP:population ratio. At the beginning of her career, a GP can buy her practice from a colleague who is retiring. Otherwise, she must …nd new patients. If many new practitioners try to set up at the same time in the same area, the start up of the careers will be hampered by competition between beginners. Our results suggest that the …rst years of practice are decisive for a GP. If she fails to attract enough patients at this …rst stage, she will su¤er from permanently lower earnings.
Another way in which the numerus clausus might in ‡uence GPs' earnings is that it introduces a selection which might induce an increase in the average ability of physicians. Unfortunately, we do not have information about selection rates for cohorts prior to 1987. Therefore it is not possible for us to go further in exploring this supply-side explanation of cohort e¤ects.
Interactions between cohort and experience
Can a ‡atter experience pro…le compensate for being in a disadvantaged cohort? Time, experience and cohort e¤ects are speci…ed as additive in model (1). This comes down to assuming that the experience e¤ect is identical for all cohorts. We tested whether interaction terms between cohort and experience e¤ects were signi…cant on some pairs of cohorts that share a common range of experience. For these pairs of cohorts the interaction terms are positive, revealing that GPs belonging to cohorts with the lowest earnings compensate for their disadvantage by a ‡atter experience pro…le: they reduce their activity after the 12th year to a lesser extent than other cohorts. This can be interpreted as an additional disadvantage: given the di¢ culties they experienced at the beginning of their careers, these GPs cannot a¤ord to slow their pace of work early in their careers.
When the interaction terms are signi…cant, the estimated cohort e¤ects are stronger. For example, the gap in permanent earnings between cohorts 1977 and 1985 is 22%; instead of 11:8% when estimated without interaction terms. In that case, speci…cation (1) underestimates the cohort e¤ects.
Earnings distributions by cohort: a stochastic dominance analysis
Can individual heterogeneity compensate for average di¤erences between cohorts? So far, our approach has focused on average di¤erences in GPs'permanent earnings. However, the unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting GPs' earnings is quite large: model (1) explains only 27.55% of earnings variability (R 2 ).
Yet, it is possible that some doctors belonging to a poor cohort compensate for their disadvantage through individual dynamism or hard work. These earnings determinants are components of unobserved individual heterogeneity. We ran a stochastic dominance analysis to take the whole distribution of earnings into account. Unobserved heterogeneity is no longer considered to be a residual but included in the analysis.
Stochastic dominance analysis can be used to order earnings distributions associated with di¤erent cohorts . Following the methodology set up by Davidson and Duclos (2000) and used by Lefranc, Pistolesi,
Trannoy (2004), we ran non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance between pairs of cohorts.
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First, we applied statistical dominance analysis to distributions of raw earnings. Focusing on a few representative cohorts, we found that cohorts of the eighties and the early nineties were dominated at the …rst-order by the cohorts of the seventies and by cohort 1999. However, a ranking performed on raw earnings in not relevant, since it compares cohorts that are observed for di¤erent levels of experience and for di¤erent periods. Given the magnitude of experience and time e¤ects, it is more appropriate to compare distributions of earnings that have been homogeneized relative to these factors. In what follows, we combine the stochastic dominance analysis with microsimulations.
In our second step, we constructed an hypothetical earnings distribution for each cohort, corresponding to the amount that physicians would have earned if they had the same characteristics, except cohort and unobserved heterogeneity. The simulated earnings e y ict of physician i, belonging to cohort c in year t is de…ned as follows:
where D stands for the average GPs:population and specialist:population ratios, Z corresponds to a full-time self-employed male physician with no MEP specialization and a two-year period after his studies before beginning his practice. All simulated earnings are supposed to be observed in 1995 for The results are displayed in table 4. We focus on a few representative cohorts : 1972, 1977, 1985, 1993 and 1999 . They can be ordered using the …rst-order dominance criterion. Earnings distribution of cohort 1972 dominates all other cohorts, except 1999; whereas cohort 1985 is dominated by all cohorts. Cohorts 1972 and 1999 are equal: with identical characteristics, younger cohorts have the same distribution of earnings as the better-o¤ older cohorts. This is in line with the improvement observed in the cohorts e¤ects concerning recent cohorts.
The results of the stochastic dominance analysis thus con…rmed the …ndings of the econometric analysis.
Belonging to a "poor" cohort has a systematic e¤ect: unobserved heterogeneity does not compensate for average di¤erences in earnings between cohorts. 
Notes : (SD1): the row dominates the column for …rst-order stochastic dominance (SD1): the column dominates the row for …rst-order stochastic dominance; =: the distributions are equal The tests are performed with a 5% signi…cance level. Statistic values and con…dence intervals are not reported on. They are available upon request.
Conclusion
In France, almost all general practitioners are self-employed and paid through a fee-for-service scheme.
Reference fees are …xed by negociations between doctors and the health insurance administration. Given this context, GPs'earnings are closely related to the number of their encounters with patients, and hence on the number of other practicing GPs. In this article,we have examined the relationship between changes in medical demography and earnings inequality among doctors.
Using longitudinal data, we estimated earnings functions to identify experience, cohort and time e¤ects. The cohort is de…ned by the …rst year in practice. We …nd sizeable cohort e¤ects: ceteris paribus, GPs who began to practice in 1985 earn 19:6% less than those who began to practice in 1972.
Earnings where higher for GPs who set up their practices from the mid-nineties on: cohort 1999 earns 16:8% more than cohort 1985. These e¤ects come on top of experience e¤ects, time e¤ects, and the impact of competition intensity at the local level: they can be interpreted as permanent di¤erences in earnings associated to the …rst year of practice. Moreover, stochastic dominance analysis shows that belonging to a "poor" cohort has a systematic e¤ect: unobserved heterogeneity does not compensate for average di¤erences in earnings between cohorts.
Cohort e¤ects are strongly correlated with the number of new practitioners and the di¤erence between the number of new arrivals and the number of retirements at the beginning of practice. We could not test for causal e¤ects, but our results suggest that the …rst years of practice are decisive for GPs. Baby-boom cohorts faced intense competition at the beginning of their practices and they have the lowest earnings. Subsequent cohorts bene…ted from the numerus clausus on medical students and from early retirement incentives implemented between 1988 and 2003. Our results show that these policies buoyed up permanent physicians'earnings.
Why is medical demography so crucial at the beginning of careers? Our estimated experience e¤ects show that the …rst stage of a GP's career is characterized by a phase of recruitment of patients. It is possible that di¢ culties experienced at this stage have a lasting impact on the whole career. Indeed, a small number of patients for a GP who is no longer a beginner can act as a signal that the physician is not competent and thus discourage potential patients. Further investigations are needed to give empirical support to this interpretation.
